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1 INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing amount of data available in today’s world,
particularly from the web, social media platforms and crowdsourc-
ing systems. The openness of such platforms makes it simple for
a wide range of users to share information quickly and easily, po-
tentially reaching a wide international audience. It is inevitable
that amongst this abundance of data there are conflicts, where data
sources disagree on the truth regarding a particular object or entity.
This can be caused by low-quality sources mistakenly providing
erroneous data, or by malicious sources aiming to misinform.
Truth discovery methods have emerged to resolve such con-
flicts and find the true facts by considering the trustworthiness of
sources [9, 10]. The general principle is that believable facts are
those claimed by trustworthy sources, and trustworthy sources are
those that claim believable facts. Application areas include real-time
traffic navigation [7], crowdsourcing and social sensing [11, 16].
In this paper we initiate work on formal foundations for truth dis-
covery by providing a general framework which allows algorithms
to be evaluated in a principled way based on their theoretical prop-
erties. To do so we pose truth discovery as a social choice problem
and apply the axiomatic approach, as has been successfully done for
closely related problems such as judgment aggregation [8], voting
theory [17] and ranking systems [1, 2, 13].
2 A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUTH DISCOVERY
We consider fixed finite and mutually disjoint sets S, F and O,
called the sources, facts and objects respectively. Sources represent
providers of information (e.g. social media users, websites), facts
represent (potentially false) pieces of information, and objects rep-
resent real-world entities or questions to which the facts relate.
A core definition of the framework is that of a truth discovery
network, which represents the input to a truth discovery problem.
In keeping with the literature, we model this as a tripartite graph
with certain constraints [9, 15].
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Figure 1: Example TD network with sources {s, t,u,v}, facts
{ f ,д,h, i} and objects {o,p}.
Definition 2.1. A truth discovery network (hereafter a TD network)
is a directed graph N = (V , E) where V = S ∪ F ∪ O, and E ⊆
(S × F ) ∪ (F × O) has the following properties:
(1) For each f ∈ F there is a unique o ∈ O with (f ,o) ∈ E,
denoted objN (f ). That is, each fact is associated with exactly
one object.
(2) For s ∈ S and o ∈ O, there is at most one directed path from
s to o. That is, sources cannot claim multiple facts for an
object.
(3) (S × F )∩E is non-empty. That is, at least one claim is made.
We say that s claims f when (s, f ) ∈ E. Let N denote the set of
all TD networks. Note that the special case of our framework where
every object has exactly two associated facts is close to the setting
studied in judgment aggregation [8] and binary aggregation with
abstentions [5, 6]. As an example, consider the network N shown
in Fig. 1. Here sources s and t disagree on the true fact for object o
(claiming f and д respectively). Sources u and v do not comment
on object o, but agree with t for object p.
To simplify the notation in what follows, for a network N =
(V , E) we write factsN (s) = { f ∈ F : (s, f ) ∈ E} for the set of facts
claimed by a source s , and srcN (f ) = {s ∈ S : (s, f ) ∈ E} for the
set of sources claiming a fact f .
We now turn to the output of truth discovery. Contrary to many
approaches in the literature, we consider the output to be rankings
of the sources and facts. This is because for the theoretical analysis
we wish to perform it is only important that a source is more trust-
worthy than another; the particular numeric scores produced by
an algorithm are irrelevant. This point of view is common across
the social choice literature. Formally, let L(X ) denote the set of all
total preorders on a set X . We define a truth discovery operator as
follows.
Definition 2.2. A truth discovery operator T (hereafter TD op-
erator) is a mapping T : N → L(S) × L(F ). We shall write
T (N ) = (⊑TN , ⪯TN ), i.e. ⊑TN is a total preorder on S and ⪯TN is a
total preorder on F . We interpret s1 ⊑TN s2 to mean s2 is at least as
trustworthy as s1 (and similarly for facts).
3 AXIOMS FOR TRUTH DISCOVERY
We now introduce axioms for truth discovery. Many axioms are
adapted from the social choice literature, although modifications
are necessary in places to match the semantics of truth discovery.
A guiding principle of many truth discovery approaches is that
sources claiming highly believed facts are trustworthy, and that
facts backed by highly trusted sources are believable; the source and
fact rankings should cohere in this sense. We capture this intuition
for specific cases in our first two axioms, which are inspired by
transitivity axioms for ranking systems [2, 13].
First, a preliminary definition is required. For Y ,Y ′ ⊆ F , we say
Y is less believable than Y ′ with respect to a TD network N and
operator T if there is a bijection ϕ : Y → Y ′ such that f ⪯TN ϕ(f )
for each f ∈ Y , and fˆ ≺TN ϕ( fˆ ) for some fˆ ∈ Y . For X ,X ′ ⊆ S we
define X less trustworthy than X ′ with respect to N andT similarly.
Axiom 1 (Source Coherence). If factsN (s1) is less believable than
factsN (s2) with respect to N and T , then s1 ⊏TN s2.
Axiom 2 (Fact Coherence). If srcN (f1) is less trustworthy than
srcN (f2) with respect to N and T , then f1 ≺TN f2.
For the next axiom, we say TD networks N and N ′ are equivalent
if there is a graph isomorphism π between them that preserves
sources, facts and objects, i.e., π (s) ∈ S, π (f ) ∈ F and π (o) ∈ O. In
such case we write π (N ) for N ′.
Axiom 3 (Symmetry). If N and N ′ = π (N ) are equivalent networks,
then s1 ⊑TN s2 iff π (s1) ⊑TN ′ π (s2) and f1 ⪯TN f2 iff π (f1) ⪯TN ′ π (f2).
The next axiom states that when f receives extra support from
a new source s , its ranking should receive a strictly positive boost.
Note this axiom assumes sources do not have ‘negative’ trust levels;
otherwise extra support could be reason for decreased belief in f .
Axiom4 (Monotonicity). SupposeN ∈ N , s ∈ S, f ∈ F \factsN (s).
Write E for the set of edges in N , and let N ′ be the network with edges
E ′ = {(s, f )} ∪ E \ {(s,д) : д , f , objN (д) = objN (f )} Then for all
д , f , д ⪯TN f implies д ≺TN ′ f .
An important idea in social choice is independence. In voting,
a core axiom is IIA [4], which says the social ranking of a and b
depends only on the individual preferences of a vs b. In the truth
discovery context, an analogous axiom would state that the ranking
of facts f1 and f2 for some object o depends only on the sources
which make a claim for o.
However, one may claim this property is undesirable, since truth
discovery aims to infer the believability of the fi based on the
trustworthiness of their sources, which may in turn depend on facts
for objects other than o. This undesirability can be made precise:
in combination with Symmetry and Monotonicity, it implies T
ranks facts for the same object by a simple voting procedure, where
each source votes for the facts it claims (c.f. [5]). That is, source
trustworthiness is not considered at all. Formally:
Axiom 5 (Per-object Independence (POI)). Let o ∈ O, N1,N2 ∈ N .
Suppose obj−1N1 (o) = obj−1N2 (o) = Fo and srcN1 (f ) = srcN2 (f ) for each
f ∈ Fo . Then f1 ⪯TN1 f2 iff f1 ⪯TN2 f2 for all f1, f2 ∈ Fo .
Theorem 3.1. Let T be any operator satisfying Symmetry, Mono-
tonicity and POI, and suppose objN (f1) = objN (f2). Then f1 ⪯TN f2
iff |srcN (f1)| ≤ |srcN (f2)|.
Voting SC-Voting Sums [12] U-Sums
S. Coherence X ✓ ✓ ✓
F. Coherence ✓ X ✓ ✓
Symmetry ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mon. ✓ ✓ X ?
POI ✓ ✓ X X
PCI ✓ X X ✓
Table 1: Satisfaction of the axioms for the various operators.
Recall that the Coherence axioms encode the idea that source
trustworthiness should inform the fact ranking and vice versa.
Clearly the voting procedure implied by Thm. 3.1 does not meet
these criteria, so we should expect Source and Fact Coherence to
fail. Indeed, we have the following impossibility result.
Theorem 3.2. There is no TD operator satisfying Source Coherence,
Fact Coherence, Symmetry, Monotonicity and POI.
Since the Coherence axioms represent the core intuition behind
truth discovery, Thm. 3.2 provides further justification that POI is
undesirable. Fig. 1 provides the counterexample used in the proof:
applying the voting procedure to h, i and f ,д gives h ≺TN i and
f ≈TN д, so by Source Coherence we get s ⊏TN t ; but then Fact
Coherence gives f ≺TN д – a contradiction.
The problemwith POI is that the indirect links – such as between
f and h in Fig. 1 – cannot be considered in the rankings. Our final
rendering of independence allows such links to be used, while still
ensuring the ranking of facts (and sources) does not depend on
irrelevant details of the input network.
Axiom 6 (Per-component Independence (PCI)). SupposeN1 andN2
have a common connected component G. Then for all s1, s2 ∈ G ∩ S
and f1, f2 ∈ G ∩ F , we have s1 ⊑TN1 s2 iff s1 ⊑TN2 s2 and f1 ⪯TN1 f2
iff f1 ⪯TN2 f2.1
Table 1 shows the satisfaction of our axioms for some example op-
erators. Voting is a trivial baseline operator which ranks all sources
equally and ranks facts according to the number of claims received.
It is possible to modify Voting to achieve Source Coherence at the
expense of Fact Coherence (which Voting only satisfies vacuously)
and PCI; we call this operator SC-Voting. For a non-trivial example,
we considered Sums [12], which is well-known in the literature.
It satisfies both Coherence axioms, but surprisingly fails PCI and
Monotonicity. In some sense the cause of PCI failure is a numeric
normalisation step at each iteration of the Sums algorithm; remov-
ing this step and modifying the convergence criteria accordingly
we obtain a new operator we call U-Sums, which retains Coherence
whilst satisfying PCI.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper we formalised a mathematical framework for truth dis-
covery and initiated axiomatic study of the problem. We provided
an impossibility result and brief axiomatic analysis of example op-
erators. Future work in this area will investigate state-of-the-art
algorithms with respect to the axioms, and determine whether exist-
ing methods actually find the truth as opposed to simply consensus
amongst sources.
1We have found that real-world datasets with multiple connected components do exist:
for example the Book and Restaurant datasets found at the following web page each
contain two connected components: http://lunadong.com/fusionDataSets.htm
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